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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PATENT LITIGATION 
TIMING:  COULD A PATENT TERM REDUCTION 
DECIMATE TROLLS WITHOUT HARMING 
INNOVATORS? 
 
Brian J. Love
*
 
 
 
Preliminary draft 
 
This article reports the findings of an empirical analysis of the relative 
ages of patents litigated by practicing and non-practicing patentees.  
Studying all infringement claims brought to enforce a sample of recently 
expired patents, I find considerable variance.  Product-producing 
companies predominately enforce their patents soon after issuance and 
complete their enforcement activities well before their patent rights expire.  
NPEs, by contrast, begin asserting their patents relatively late in the patent 
term and frequently continue to litigate to the verge of expiration.  This 
variance in litigation timing is so dramatic that all claims asserting the 
average product-company patent are resolved before the average NPE 
patent is asserted for the first time.  Further, I find that NPEs are the 
dominate source of patent enforcement in the final few years of the patent 
term.  NPEs, enforcers of just twenty percent of all studied patents, are 
responsible for more than two-thirds of all suits and over eighty percent of 
all patent claims litigated in the final three years of the patent term.  These 
findings cast serious doubt on the utility of the last few years of the patent 
term and suggest that Congress should, at a minimum, act to increase the 
frequency and magnitude of maintenance fee payments in the latter half of 
the patent term. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of non-practicing entities (―NPEs‖), or ―patent trolls‖ to 
some, is among the most important of all patent-related empirical 
endeavors.  So far, however, scholars have analyzed litigation brought by 
various types of patent owners in a rather fragmented and indirect fashion.  
Some have studied only the most litigious or easily identifiable ―trolls.‖1  
Such studies miss as much as ninety percent of NPE-asserted patents.
2
  
Others have focused exclusively on litigation filed during a handful of years 
in the last decade.
3
  These studies fail to account for vast differences among 
patents that happen to be litigated at the same time.  It makes little sense, for 
example, to compare the first-and-only litigation of a one-year-old medical 
device patent to the twentieth litigation of a nineteen-year-old software 
patent, even if both proceed contemporaneously.   
Perhaps not surprisingly, these narrow studies have produced results at 
odds with one another.  The empirical literature examining NPEs is, to put it 
mildly, internally inconsistent.  Some studies strongly suggest that NPEs are 
every bit the tail that wags the dog.  NPEs, for example, assert the lionshare 
of most-litigated patents
4
 and are especially dominate in high-tech fields, 
where patents tend to be plentiful, cheap, and broad.
5
  Others report the 
                                                 
1
 See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) 
(studying only ―the ten most litigious NPEs‖); John R. Allison, et al., Patent Quality and 
Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677 (2011) [hereinafter Patent 
Quality and Settlement] (comparing the characteristics, including NPE-status, of patents 
asserted eight or more times and patents asserted just once); John R. Allison, et al., 
Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Extreme Value] (studying the same ―most-litigated‖ 
patents); see also Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market Makers? An Empirical Analysis of 
Non-Practicing  Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 147-48 (studying only those NPEs 
identified in the press as NPEs).   
2
 In the sample gathered for this study, less than ten percent of NPE-asserted patents 
(eight of eighty-four) were litigated in eight or more suits.  About seven percent (six of 
eighty-four) were asserted by the ten NPEs studied by Michael Risch.   
3
 See Patent Quality and Settlement, supra (studying litigation brought between 2000 
and 2007); Extreme Value, supra (studying the same cases); Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, 
Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech 
Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2009) (studying high tech cases filed between January 2000 
and March 2008); Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: 
Strategic Behavior by Individual Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent 
Litigation (working paper 2009) (studying every case filed between 2000 and 2002). 
4
 Patent Quality and Settlement, supra note _ at *15 (reporting that NPEs filed 63.5 
percent of patent cases asserting patents litigated eight or more times, but just 21 percent of 
cases asserting patents litigated only once). 
5
 Id. at *18 (further reporting that over seventy-four percent of the most-litigated 
patents cover software-related inventions); Chien, Of Trolls, supra note _ at 1572 
(reporting that a subset of NPEs account for seventeen percent of patent suits and twenty-
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exact opposite.  Trolls really don‘t exist at all,6 exist but are exceedingly 
rare,
7
 or exist in modest numbers but hold few of the traits attributed to 
them by their detractors.
8
  
This article fills the aforementioned gaps in the existing literature by 
studying a broad cross-section of patents over the entire patent term.  Rather 
than a subset of patents linked by litigiousness or contemporaneous court 
filings, I study a random sample of all recently expired patents and collect 
data on all patent enforcement undertaken prior to their expiration.   
With data on all litigation filed during these patents‘ lives, I can for the 
first time report results taking into account the relative timing of litigation 
filed by practicing and non-practicing entities.  My findings are dramatic.  
Opposing views of NPEs in the literature ring true, but at opposite ends of 
the patent term.  Product companies predominately enforce their patents 
soon after they issue and complete their enforcement activities well before 
their patents expire.  NPEs, on the other hand, begin asserting their patents 
relatively late in the patent term and frequently continue to litigate their 
patents to the verge of expiration.  Indeed, I find that the average product-
company patent has been shelved by its owner before the average NPE 
patent has even been asserted.  
The degree to which NPEs dominate the final few years of the patent 
term is especially shocking.  Though asserting just over twenty percent of 
all studied patents, NPEs account for more than two-thirds of suits and over 
eighty percent of patent claims litigated in the final three years of the patent 
term.  Notably, NPEs‘ domination of late-term litigation is almost 
completely attributable to firms that do nothing more than hold patents.  
NPEs that many do not consider trolls – universities and individual 
inventors, in particular – do not drive the results reported below.9 
                                                                                                                            
eight percent of patent claims in high-tech industries); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009 (2007) (estimating that 
NPEs file thirty to forty percent of patent suits involving computer and electronic 
technology). 
6
 See Innovators Fear the Patent Trolls, TMCNEWS, May 7, 2006, 
http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2006/05/07/1639931.htm (―Patent trolls ‗don‘t exist.  
Trolls are imaginary creatures . . . . I think the whole issue is overblown.‘‖ (quoting Carl 
Gulbrandsen, Managing Director of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation)); 
Michael C. Smith, ―Patent Pirates” Only Exist in Neverland, TEX. LAWYER, Oct. 11, 2004. 
7
 Ball & Kesan, supra note _, at 2 (―We find that licensing firms . . . are a very small 
percentage of all plaintiffs . . . . [and] our results suggest that patent litigation is not 
dominated by ‗trolls‘ . . . .‖); Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary 
Creatures: A Comments Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 165, 166 (2007) (estimating that ―only two percent of all patent litigation is linked 
to so-called trolling‖). 
8
 Risch, supra note _; Shrestha, supra note _. 
9
 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
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I also compare the relative litigiousness of product companies and 
NPEs, as well as differences in the subject matter and strength of their 
infringement claims.  In addition to overall findings, I report how these 
statistics change among patents litigated in the final years of the patent 
term.  I find that NPEs are especially litigious, overwhelmingly assert high-
tech patents, and lose at a relatively high rate when their infringement 
claims are adjudicated on the merits.  I also find that, with patents litigated 
late the patent term, NPEs are more litigious, more high-tech focused, and 
more likely to lose on the merits of their infringement claims.  Interestingly, 
I also find that an outsized percentage of product company patents litigated 
late in the term are high-tech related.  These patents, I find, are asserted by a 
unique group of companies that, though they sell a product, blur the line 
between practicing entities and trolls. 
 My findings add to mounting evidence that the costs of NPE litigation 
outweigh their benefits.  In fact, they cast serious doubt on NPEs‘ chief 
alleged benefits: that paper patentees help create a market for innovation 
and contribute to the dissemination of useful technology.  Instead, it seems, 
NPEs overwhelmingly wait to assert their rights until the underlying 
technology is stale and unlikely to be of much use to accused infringers, 
who very likely independently developed the technology years earlier.
10
  
Overall, my findings suggest that Congress may be well-advised to shorten 
the patent term by three years or even longer.
11
  In these final years of 
patent protection, more than eighty percent of patent assertions are brought 
by patent-holding firms that have no intention of commercializing a 
product.  Much of the remaining litigation is brought by product companies 
asserting high-tech patents with far less than ideal motivation.  At the very 
least, Congress and the PTO should act to increase the frequency and 
magnitude of maintenance fee payments required in the latter half of the 
patent term. 
                                                                                                                            
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008) (arguing that universities are not ―trolls‖); Chien, Of Trolls, 
supra note _, at 1578 (arguing that individual inventors also fall outside the scope of 
patentees that deserve the label ―troll‖). 
10
 See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. 
REV. 1421, 1424 (2009) (finding that allegations of copying are rare in patent litigation, 
especially in cases asserting high-tech patents). 
11
 For a discussion of study limitations that temper this recommendation, including a 
discussion of NPEs‘ ability to simply file suit earlier in the event of a term reduction, see 
infra Part III.C. 
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I.  STUDY DESIGN 
 
On the issue of patent reform, a civil war of sorts divides the technology 
community.
12
  In this fight, battle lines are drawn largely between 
industries.  Pharmaceutical companies, on one side, argue that strong patent 
rights are crucial to continued innovation.  High-tech firms, on the other, 
view the patent system more as foe than friend.  According to these firms, 
and echoed by many scholars and patent attorneys, the patent system is far 
too often a vehicle for ―patent trolls‖ – entities that assert patents they do 
not use and frequently did not invent – to extract undeserved royalties from 
true innovators working to build successful new high-tech products.
13
   
How these opposing views of the patent system should be reconciled 
turns in large part on questions concerning the utility of NPEs.  Are NPEs 
the pervasive litigation cost extortionists their detractors make them out to 
be?
14
  Or are they, as their defenders contend, small-time players that help 
disseminate useful technology
15
 and create markets for inventions
16
 and 
safety nets for inventors?
17
 
  
A.  Hypotheses 
 
Unfortunately, existing literature has done little to settle the debate.  
One reason is that, even after several studies on the topic, commentators 
                                                 
12
 See,e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 3-6 (2009). 
13
 Patent ―trolls‖ are so named because they bear resemblance to mythological trolls 
who emerge without warning from beneath bridges to demand a toll from all who pass. 
14
 See, e.g., Timothy J. Haller & Sally Wiggins, The Patent Troll Myth, in IP VALUE 
2006, at 113 (2006) (explaining that in 1991 Intel was sued for libel after referring to an 
NPE as a ―patent extortionist‖); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 341, 368 (2010); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls 
and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1830 (2007). 
15
 See John C. Paul, et al., Patent Trolls: A Stereotype Causes a Backlash Against 
Patents and Licensing, 41 LES NOUVELLES 224, 232 (2006). 
16
 See James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An 
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 
189, 190 (2006) (―[P]atent trolls make the patent market more efficient by realigning 
market participant incentives, making patents more liquid, and clearing the patent 
market.‖). 
17
 See John E. Dubiansky, An Analysis for the Valuation of Venture Capital-Funded 
Startup Firm Patents, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 170, 171-72 (2006); Ronald J. Mann, Do 
Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1024 (2005) 
(―[T]rolls are serving a function as intermediaries that specialize in litigation to exploit the 
value of patents that cannot be exploited effectively by those that have originally obtained 
them.‖). 
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cannot agree what percentage of patent enforcement is attributable to NPEs.  
Results have been all over the map.  NPEs, or some ―trollish‖ subset 
thereof, account for two,
18
 four,
19
 eighteen,
20
 or twenty-seven
21
 percent of 
patent litigation depending on whom you ask.  Though diverse, these 
relatively modest estimates have led at least one scholar to declare that ―the 
uniform findings indicate that NPEs file only a small fraction of all patent 
infringement suits.‖22  Other tantalizing clues, however, suggest that NPEs 
have anything but a modest effect on the patent system.  A study of patents 
litigated eight or more times, for example, found that NPEs owned more 
than sixty percent,
23
 and multiple studies have found that NPEs file as much 
as forty percent of suits asserting high-tech patents.
24
   
What accounts for these seemingly inconsistent results?  This article 
tests the hypothesis that existing studies of NPE litigation are incomplete 
because they fail to take into account differences in the relative ages of 
patents asserted by practicing and non-practicing entities.  In fact, it 
suggests that all previous empirical studies underestimate NPEs‘ true 
impact because they fail to compare NPE patents with other patents their 
own age. 
To date, no scholar studying NPEs‘ share of patent litigation has 
included a temporal component in her analysis.
25
  This omission is 
surprising because there is good reason to believe that product-producing 
companies and NPEs assert their patents on very different timelines.  If, as 
many suggest, patentees who sell products covered by their patent rights 
primarily value patents for their exclusionary power,
26
 these patentees 
                                                 
18
 Morgan, supra note _, at 166 (estimating that ―only two percent of all patent 
litigation is linked to so-called trolling‖); Nathan Myhrvold, Inventors Have Rights, Too!, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2006, at A14 (reporting the same statistic). 
19
 Ball & Kesan, supra note _, at 15 (finding that ―3% of plaintiffs, who were active in 
4% of the cases, were licensing firms‖). 
20
 Compare LexMachina, Fora, https://lexmachina.com/members/ courts?filter=Patent 
(reporting that there were 2572 patent cases filed in U.S. district courts in 2008, 2586 in 
2009, and 2835 in 2010) with Patent Freedom, Current Research: Litigations Over Time, 
https://www.patentfreedom.com/research-lot.html (showing that there were just over 500 
NPE-filed suits in 2008, just under 500 in 2009, and about 425 in 2010). 
21
 Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, at *31-32 (working paper 2011) 
(finding in a sample of 667 litigated patents issued in 1990 that 27% were asserted by 
either a ―patent assertion entity‖ or an individual).  
22
 Risch, supra note _, at 8. 
23
 Patent Quality and Settlement, supra note _ at *15 (reporting that NPEs filed 63.5 
percent of patent cases asserting patents litigated eight or more times). 
24
 Chien, Of Trolls, supra note _, at 1572; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note _, at 2009. 
25
 Michael Risch found that highly-litigious NPEs asserted their patents on average 
longer than 8.5 years after issue, but did not compare this delay with data on product 
companies‘ timing.  Risch, supra note _, at 27-28. 
26
 See Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 286 (2009) (noting 
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should file suit (if at all) soon after their patents issue to fend off 
competitors developing or introducing similar products.  In addition, 
because products generally have short lifecycles relative to the patent term
27
 
and next generation products may be protected by newer patents, practicing 
patentees should generally cease litigating a patent well before it expires 
and move on to litigating newer patents covering newer products. 
By contrast, there is good reason to believe that NPEs overwhelmingly 
litigate their patents late in the patent term.  For one, many NPEs do not file 
their own patent applications, but instead purchase patents on the secondary 
market (often from failed companies
28
) for the purposes of litigation.
29
  
Naturally, it takes time for such patents to reach NPEs.
30
  Further because 
NPEs primarily value patents for their usefulness in extracting royalties and 
damages from product-producing companies,
31
 these patentees should 
generally wait to file suit until a lucrative industry has developed and 
continue filing suits as long as deep-pocketed targets remain.
32
 
If these characterizations are rooted in fact rather than anecdote, it 
makes little sense to base patent policy on calculations of the bare 
percentage of NPE suits among those brought during some year or group of 
years.  Product companies are far and away the chief players in the patent 
system and such studies will always reflect this fact.
33
  What they cannot 
reflect, however, is whether NPEs begin to have a disproportionate effect at 
some point during the patent term and how such a finding would color 
NPEs‘ claims that they are beneficial market makers and disseminators of 
technology.   
 
                                                                                                                            
that NPEs and product companies ―have asymmetrical incentives, since trolls are only 
interested in exacting payments whereas commercializers often resolve infringement 
disputes with other commercializers through cross-licensing arrangements‖). 
27
 In the computer industry, for example, products become twice as powerful about 
every two years.  See infra note _. 
28
 Risch, supra note _, at 27 (finding that over one quarter of companies from which 
studied NPE patents were acquired were no longer operating). 
29
 See, e.g., Crane, supra note _, at 286 (―Patent trolls are firms that aggregate patents 
for technology that they usually did not themselves create and do not themselves use, but 
for which they seek to exact royalty payments from commercial users.‖). 
30
 See infra, Part _. 
31
 See supra note _. 
32
 See Mann, supra note _, at 1027 (noting ―a particular type of conduct by trolls that is 
viewed as especially damaging by industry executives: the strategy of waiting after a patent 
has been issued while an industry advances using the covered technology and then suing 
widely for infringement only after the industry has become locked into the technology 
through independent innovation and development‖). 
33
 See Figure 1 infra. 
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B.  Compiling a Database 
 
To test these hypotheses, I set out to collect data on all litigation 
asserting a sample of recently expired patents.  Using Westlaw and 
PACER,
34
 I located every litigated
35
 patent
36
 that issued with a patent 
number falling between 5,210,000 and 5,309,999.  These patents issued 
between May 11, 1993 and May 10, 1994 (―the study period‖).37   
As shown below in Table 2, I identified 1,143 patents issued during the 
study period
38
 that were litigated in a district court, the Court of Federal 
                                                 
34
 Public Access to Court Electronic Records, http://www.pacer.gov/psco/cgi-
bin/links.pl. 
35
 Here and throughout, by ―litigated‖ I mean asserted in an action raising a claim for 
infringement (or for a declaration of noninfringement or invalidity of) the studied patent, as 
opposed to merely involved in litigation concerning ownership, inventorship, antitrust, 
contract, trademark, copyright, or other patent claims.  See infra Part _. 
36
 Here and throughout, I use ―patent‖ to refer exclusively to ―utility‖ patents.  This 
study does not include design patents or plant patents, both of which are protected by 
separate statutory schemes.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-73 (design patents); 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-
64 (codifying the Plant Protection Act); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (codifying the Plant 
Variety Protection Act). 
37
 Under the law in effect at the time these patents issued, each would have expired 
between May 11, 2010 and May 10, 2011.  35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (setting the patent term 
at seventeen years from the date the patent issued).  Legislation passed in December 1994 
modifying the patent duration granted patents then-in-force the longer of 17 years from 
issue or 20 years from filing.  35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1).  Because an application spends on 
average close to three years at the PTO, these calculations generally provide a similar term 
of protection.  See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the 
United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 98 (2002) (finding that patents issued 
between 1996 and 1998 spent an average of 2.77 years in prosecution).  Many patents, 
however, receive a modest extension under the new law.  See Mark A. Lemley, An 
Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 385 (1994) (finding 
that, on average, the twenty-year calculation extended patentees‘ rights by 253 days in the 
mid-1990s).   
Thus, while the vast majority of these patents expired in 2010 or early 2011, a minority 
remain in force.  Because suits are very rare in the waning months of the patent term, 
however, this fact should not significantly impact the results reported below.  Less than 
0.75% of suits asserting now-expired patents were brought in the last year of the patent 
term; less than 0.25% were filed in the last four months.  No patent issued during the study 
period has been asserted for the very first time since March 2011.  Today, patent pendency 
times are much longer than they were in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  At the close of 
2009, the PTO employed just over 6,000 examiners and faced a backlog of more than 
700,000 applications awaiting their first office action.  U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
Patent Inventory Statistics--FY09 (2009), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/appbacklog.jsp.  
38
 The earliest, U.S. Patent No. 5,210,272, issued on May 11, 1993; the latest, U.S. 
Patent No. 5,309,861, on May 10, 1994.  This rate of assertion (1.143%) comports with 
prior estimates of the percentage of litigated patents.  See Chien, Predicting Patent 
Litigation, supra note _, at *9, n.37 (estimating that approximately 0.6% to 1.1% of issued 
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Claims, or at the International Trade Commission (―ITC‖).39  In the 90 
district courts located in U.S. states and the District of Columbia, court 
clerks‘ offices report basic information on patent suits to the PTO, and 
searchable copies of these reports are available via Westlaw‘s Derwent 
LitAlert database.
40
  From these reports I identified 1,124 patents.
41
  The 
LitAlert database, however, does not include records for cases filed in the 
remaining four ―territorial‖ district courts.42  To locate all identifiable 
patents asserted solely in these courts, I searched PACER docket reports 
and pleadings (where available
43
) for all patent cases brought in each court 
                                                                                                                            
patents are litigated); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1495, 1507 (2001) (estimating that only about 1.5% of patents are ever litigated). 
39
 Patent suits fall within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts, 28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a), and may generally be brought in any U.S. district court which has 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, see generally Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310 (1945), and where venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).  One exception is patent 
claims against the United States, which must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims.  28 
U.S.C. § 1498.  The ITC holds in rem jurisdiction over imported goods that infringe a U.S. 
patent.  19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).  ITC orders barring the entry of infringing goods into 
the U.S. may be appealed to the Court of International Trade.  19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(4).  The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit holds appellate jurisdiction over the Court of 
Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, and all patent-related cases brought in 
district courts.  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1),(3),(5).   See also David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman 
Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1077 (2010) (noting that patent litigation 
occurs ―in the federal district courts, the International Trade Commission, and the Court of 
Federal Claims‖). 
40
 Searching the LitAlert database confirms that all 90 districts located in the 50 states 
(and D.C.) submitted litigation reports to the PTO throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  Thus, 
any missing patents should be attributable to idiosyncratic oversight, rather than 
widespread failure in any particular district to file reports with the PTO. 
41
 Patents from this timeframe were asserted in 74 of the 90 total districts, including 
districts located in 45 of the 50 states and the District of D.C.  Each of the top 46 districts, 
ranked by number of patent filings since 2000, is represented.  See LexMachina, Fora, 
https://lexmachina.com/members/courts?filter=Patent.  These 74 districts account for over 
98% of patent suits filed since 2000.  See id. 
42
 These four are the District of Guam, District for the Northern Mariana Islands, 
District of Puerto Rico, and District for the Virgin Islands.  This is not surprising because 
these four ―territorial‖ districts collectively see about one patent case per year.  See id. 
(reporting that between 2000 and 2010 just 14 patent suits were filed in these four 
territories).  Virtually all of these cases were filed in the District of Puerto Rico, which 
apparently ceased sending patent litigation reports to the PTO in the 1980s.   
43
 Starting in approximately 2000 and continuing incrementally thereafter on a district 
by district basis, federal court filings and orders are available online in pdf format.  Prior to 
electronic filing, docket entries are simply described in short on docket reports.  Thus, 
despite hand collection, this data set is potentially under-inclusive for ―territorial‖ district 
courts and the Court of Federal Claims.  Nonetheless, collection in this manner gives ―the 
best, most representative data set available.‖  Patent Quality & Settlement, supra note _, at 
5, n.22 (discussing limitations in data collected from PACER by the Stanford IP Litigation 
Clearinghouse). 
10 PATENT LITIGATION TIMING – DRAFT [15-Sep-11 
during or after 1993 and cross-referenced these results with all relevant 
patent numbers cited in opinions or orders issued by any of these courts in 
1993 or later.  From these records I was able to locate another two unique 
patent numbers, and two duplicates.
44
  Similarly, to locate all identifiable 
patents asserted solely against the U.S., I searched PACER docket reports 
and pleadings for all patent cases brought in the Court of Federal Claims 
during or after 1993 and cross-referenced these results with all relevant 
patent numbers cited in opinions or orders issued by the court in 1993 or 
later.  From these records I was able to locate another five unique patent 
numbers, and one duplicate.
45
  Finally, to locate all identifiable patents 
asserted only at the ITC,
46
 I searched Westlaw‘s database of ITC filings and 
cross-referenced these results with all relevant patent numbers cited in 
opinions or orders issued by the U.S. Court of International Trade in 1993 
or later.
47
  From these records, I was able to locate another twelve unique 
patent numbers, and twenty-two duplicates. 
 
Table 1: Database Composition by Venue 
 
         Venue               Patents: Total Unique   Source: Database 
U.S. District Courts 1,124   Westlaw: LITALERT 
 
U.S. Territorial Courts 4 2 PACER; Westlaw: DCTGU, 
DCTMP, DCTPR, DCTVI 
  
Court of Federal Claims 6 5 PACER; Westlaw: FEDCL 
 
ITC/Court of Int‘l Trade 34 12 Westlaw: USITC-FILINGS,  
FINT-CIT 
 
C.  Sampling and Data Collection 
 
From these 1,143 patents, I randomly selected a sample of 450 to 
                                                 
44
 I identified a total of four patents issued during the study period that were asserted in 
a ―territorial‖ district court, but two were also asserted in a district court.   
45
 These were the only five.  No patents issued during the study period were asserted in 
a district court and in the Court of Federal Claims.   
46
 Technically, the ITC‘s jurisdiction is in rem, so the suit is brought against the 
allegedly infringing goods themselves.  See Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int‘l Trade Comm‘n, 
645 F.2d 976, 985-86 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
47
 Westlaw‘s coverage of ITC filings dates back to December 1994.  See Westlaw, 
Scope USITC-FILINGS, https://web2.westlaw.com/scope/ 
default.aspx?db=USITC%2DFILINGS&RP=/scope/default.wl&RS=WLW11.07&VR=2.0
&SV=Split&FN=_top&MT=Westlaw&MST=.  Thus, this data set is underinclusive to the 
extent that patents issued during the study period were asserted at the ITC within about a 
year of issue. 
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investigate in depth.  Forty-one patents in this sample were excluded 
because they were never asserted against an alleged patent infringer.  Of 
these forty-one, thirteen patents were solely involved in litigation brought to 
resolve a dispute between putative owners or inventors.  Nine more were 
involved in patent ―false marking‖ cases brought after their expiration.48  
Another thirteen were not litigated, but merely cited in pleadings.
49
  Five 
additional patent numbers were excluded because they contained a 
typographical error,
50
 and one final patent was erroneously asserted long 
after it had expired for failure to pay maintenance fees. 
For each of the remaining 409 patents, I collected a variety of data that 
would allow me to determine when during its term of protection, in how 
many suits, and against how many infringers the patent was enforced.  Also, 
in order to compare the relative ages of patents asserted by practicing and 
non-practicing entities, I categorized the party enforcing each patent using 
patentee classes developed by Lemley and Myhrvold.
51
  Finally, in order to 
compare the diversity of technology enforced by practicing and non-
practicing entities, I categorized the invention claimed in each patent using 
technology and industry classes developed by Allison, Lemley, and 
Walker.
52
 
 
                                                 
48
 35 U.S.C. § 292 makes it unlawful to mark a product with an expired patent number 
and empowers the public to bring qui tam suits against alleged false markers seeking 
statutory damages of ―not more than $500 for every such offense.‖  In 2009, the Federal 
Circuit held that this language authorized awards of up to $500 per article, rather than per 
decision to mark.  Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (reversing a $500 award and remanding for determination of ―the number of articles 
falsely marked . . . [and] the amount of penalty to be assessed per article‖).  A flood of 
litigation soon followed.  See R. Mark McCareins & Peter Slawniak, Current State of 
Patent False Marking Litigation, 23 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 3 (2011) (noting that 
more than 600 false marking suits were filed in 2010).  Pending patent reform legislation 
passed in both Houses would amend section 292 to retroactively strip jurisdiction from 
most pending cases.  See H.R. 1249, § 16; S. 23, § 2(k) (requiring false marking plaintiffs 
to show ―competitive injury‖ and applying this change ―to all cases, without exception, 
pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act‖). 
49
 Four were cited as prior art in an answer or declaratory judgment complaint.  Nine 
were cited for another extraneous reason in pleadings bringing claims for trademark 
infringement, copyright infringement, unfair competition, and/or breach of contract. 
50
 Westlaw‘s Derwent LitAlert database was rife with erroneously transcribed patent 
numbers.  In the vast majority of cases, I was able to reverse engineer the correct patent 
number, but for a small minority I was unable to determine which patent was actually 
litigated.  The vast majority of corrected patent numbers issued within the study period, but 
a small minority did not. 
51
 Extreme Value, supra note _, at 10-11. 
52
 Id., at 6-8.  I do not address my findings with respect to technology and industry in 
detail in this Article.  These results are tentatively reserved for inclusion in a forthcoming 
companion piece. 
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1. Prosecution Data 
 
First, to calculate each patent‘s term, I determined the dates the patent 
was filed and issued.
53
  Specifically, I identified the U.S. filing date of each 
patent‘s application, or of the earliest U.S. parent application54 to which the 
patent claims priority.
55
  I also identified whether each patent‘s owner made 
all three maintenance fee payments and, if not, on which date the patent 
prematurely fell into the public domain.
56
 
 
2. Litigation Data 
 
Next, I identified enforcement statistics for each patent.
57
  Specifically, I 
identified: 
(a) the date each patent was enforced for the first time: the filing date of 
the earliest complaint alleging infringement of the patent or seeking a 
declaration that the patent was not infringed or is invalid;
58
 
(b) the date enforcement of each patent ceased: the date on which the 
very last claim asserting infringement of the patent, or seeking a contrary 
                                                 
53
 Both dates are found on the patent document itself. 
54
 Prior foreign filing dates do not start the twenty-year term.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(3). 
55
 Many patent applications blossom over time into a ―family‖ of divisional, 
continuation, and continuation-in-part child applications, each of which may in turn spawn 
their own children, and so on.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 120-21; 37 C.F.R. 1.53(b), (d).  It is 
frequently these subsequent applications, rather than their parents, which ultimately issue at 
patents.  See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent 
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 70 (2004) (noting that over half of all litigated patents 
issue from continuation applications); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent 
Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 193 (2008) (finding that, taking continuation 
applications into account, the PTO grants patents to more than 70% of applicants). 
56
 Failure to pay a maintenance fee within at least thirty months of the date on which it 
is assessed will result in the patent‘s expiration.  35 U.S.C. § 41(b)-(c). 
57
 To locate the docket number of each case asserting a given patent, I cross-referenced 
results from three databases: (i) each case in which the patent was reported as asserted in 
Westlaw‘s Derwent LitAlert database, (ii) each additional case, if any, from which a 
document was listed on Westlaw‘s ―citing references‖ for each studied patent, and (iii) 
each additional case, if any, returned by a search for the patent‘s number on the Stanford IP 
Litigation Clearinghouse.  To exclude false positives and gather litigation statistics from 
true assertions, I relied on PACER docket reports for cases filed prior to 2000 and Stanford 
IP Litigation Clearinghouse docket reports for cases filed in 2000 or later.  The dockets for 
three cases filed pre-2000 were, for unknown reasons, not available via PACER.  See No. 
97-CV-285 (D. Nev.); 96-CV-1040 (D. Nev.); 95-CV-782 (W.D. Tex.)  Because I could 
not determine when these three cases were resolved, I excluded each patent from all 
analyses related to litigation end dates. 
58
 Patents can, of course, be enforced without filing litigation.  The fact is discussed in 
detail infra, in Part _.   
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declaration, was resolved;
59
   
(c) the total number of suits in which each patent was asserted: the total 
number of unique docketed cases in which the patentee asserted the studied 
patent or alleged infringers sought declaratory relief from an imminent 
assertion, excluding parallel case pairs and consolidated cases other than 
multi-district litigation;
60
 
                                                 
59
 In suits resolved by settlement (the vast majority of cases), I identified the date the 
court granted the parties‘ stipulated motion for dismissal or for a consent judgment.  In 
suits resolved in the accused infringers‘ favor, I identified the date of the jury‘s verdict; the 
date on which the court granted the accused infringers‘ dispositive motion to dismiss (e.g., 
following a ruling that the patentee is not the true owner of the patent-in-suit), motion for 
summary judgment, or motion for judgment as a matter of law; or, in the event of an 
appeal, the date of the affirmance of any of the aforementioned.  In suits resolved in the 
patentee‘s favor, I identified the date on which the court awarded damages and/or an 
injunction, or, in the event of an appeal, the date of affirmance of these remedies.  Finally, 
for three suits in which an unsuccessful petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was 
filed, I identified the date certiorari was denied. 
I did not identify the date on which the case was ―terminated‖ – i.e., the date on which 
the court administratively closed the case.  Doing so would have counted days, months, or 
years spent litigating non-substantive post-trial or post-judgment issues, like motions for 
attorneys‘ fees and motions for sanctions.  Also, in many cases, other claims (including 
claims for infringement of other patents) continued on after claims asserting the studied 
patent had been resolved.  In these multi-claim cases, I identified the date specific to the 
claim for infringement (or DJ claim against) the studied patent. 
60
 Accused infringers will often file suit preemptively seeking a declaration of 
noninfringement or invalidity.  The vast majority of these suits are filed close in time to a 
mirror-image patent infringement complaint brought by the patent owner.  In fact, until 
recently, courts would only exercise jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions 
showing that the plaintiff held ―a reasonable apprehension of imminent suit.‖ Teva Pharm. 
USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (2005), abrogated by MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).  Patentees and accused infringers often race to the 
courthouse (albeit in different districts) in hopes of ultimately consolidating both suits in 
their forum of choice.  See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases – An 
Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 365, 404 (2000).  As declaratory 
judgment plaintiffs, accused infringers may also hold a psychological advantage with 
juries.  See id. at 368, 405 (finding that patentees win 68% of jury trials in patentee-filed 
infringement actions, but only 38% of trials held in accused infringer-filed declaratory 
judgment actions).  These case pairs typically involve the same parties and proceed in 
parallel with one another.  Because, for all intents and purposes, a declaratory judgment 
action brought in parallel with a patent infringement action is one suit, I counted them as 
such.  In a similar fashion, ITC investigations often coincide with a patent infringement suit 
filed contemporaneously in district court.  Again because, for all intents and purposes, an 
ITC investigation brought in parallel with a patent infringement action is one suit, I 
counted them as such.   
Finally, I also merged data for individual suits that were so similar and 
contemporaneous that they were consolidated into a single action.  The sole exception I 
made to this rule were multi-district litigations, which pull together a relatively large 
number of cases filed over a relatively long period of time.  My sample included three 
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(d) the total number of accused infringers against which each patent 
was asserted: the total number of unique parties against which an 
infringement claim has been filed or who filed claims seeking a declaration 
of relief therefrom;
61
  
(e) litigation outcomes: whether each patent was ever adjudicated on the 
merits and, if so, whether the outcome was a finding of infringement, non-
infringement, or invalidity;
62
 and 
(f) suit-specific and assertion-specific statistics for litigation ongoing six 
years prior to expiration: the start date, date of resolution, and number of 
accused infringers for each suit ongoing within at least six years of the 
patent-in-suit‘s expiration, and the start date and date of resolution of each 
individual infringement claim in those suits. 
 
3. Assignment History and NPE Status 
 
In order to compare enforcement timing among practicing and non-
practicing patentees, I also collected information concerning each patent‘s 
owner, including: 
(a) each patent’s chain of ownership: the number of times each patent 
changed hands between the time it was issued and the time it was first 
asserted in court, including the dates of the first assignment after issue and 
the last assignment prior to litigation;
63
 and 
                                                                                                                            
MDLs.  See In re Rembrandt Tech., LP Patent Litig, No. 07-MD-1848-GMS (D. Del.) 
(combining ten suits filed between September 2005 and November 2007); In re Acacia 
Media Tech. Corp., No. 05-MD-1114 (N.D. Cal.) (combining nineteen suits filed in 2004 
and 2005); In re Pabst Licensing, GmbH Patent Litig., No. 99-MD-1298 (E.D. La.) 
(combining eight suits filed between March 1997 and July 2002). 
61
 I excluded ―John Doe‖ parties from this number. 
62
 I did not count default judgments as ―adjudications.‖  To make the most of 
extremely limited data, the litigation outcomes reported below reflect whether each studied 
patent was ever adjudicated on the merits at the district court level; it is not adjusted to 
account for appellate outcomes.  Analysis of district court outcomes alone is not 
uncommon in the literature.  Cf. Michael J. Mazzeo, et al., Excessive or Unpredictable? An 
Empirical Analysis of Patent Infringement Awards, at *28 (working paper 2011) (studying 
only district court damages awards).  Litigation outcome data also reflects the fact that a 
small number of patents (four product-company patents and one NPE patent) were 
adjudicated multiple times with varying results. 
63
 I obtained this data from the PTO‘s Assignment on the Web for Patents (AOTW-P), 
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat.  Patent owners generally do, but are not 
required to, record assignments with the PTO.  See Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 
supra note _, at *30.   Assignments recorded with the PTO within ninety days protect 
against ownership claims of subsequent purchasers.  35 U.S.C. § 261.  However, there are 
no other benefits or penalties.  To ensure that my data reflects only true transfers of 
ownership, I excluded from this data any assignments that merely occurred as a result of an 
owner‘s name change or minor corporate reorganization.  Also, in a number of instances, 
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(b) the NPE status of each party asserting a patent: whether the entity 
asserting each patent sold a product and, if not, what kind of NPE it was.   
For this purpose I adopted the patentee classification system developed 
by Mark Lemley and Nathan Myhrvold, which is outlined below in Table 2.  
Only Class 8 patentees – those that produce a product – are ―practicing‖ 
entities.  Patentees whose status I could not determine fall in Class 10 and 
were excluded from my sample.
64
  Strictly speaking, all other classes are 
―non-practicing‖ entities.  Though NPEs are by no means a homogenous 
monolith, for simplicity‘s sake many of the results detailed below are 
reported for NPEs as a whole.  Where practicable, however, results are 
broken down by entity class so the reader may determine for herself where 
to draw the line between NPEs and ―trolls.‖   
                                                                                                                            
the party asserting a patent in litigation did not match the last-recorded owner on file with 
the PTO.  In the vast majority of such cases, I was able to determine from pleadings or 
other litigation documents whether the party was an owner by unrecorded assignment or 
simply the last-recorded owner‘s exclusive licensee.  I excluded from my calculations the 
few instances where I was unable to determine the party‘s status as owner or licensee. 
64
 Following Allison, Lemley, and Walker, I exclude Class 10 patents from my study.  
However, as they note, ―that a diligent search could not identify what an entity did suggests 
that it is likely some form of NPE.‖  Patent Quality and Settlement, supra note _, at 6, n.28.  
I excluded three patents because I was unable to determine their owners‘ NPE statuses, and 
four individually-owned patents that were exclusively licensed to patentees of 
indeterminable NPE status. 
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Table 2: Entity-Status Classes 
 
Entity Class Description 
1 Acquired patents65 
2 University heritage or tie 
3 Failed start-up 
4 Failed product company 
5 Individual-inventor-started company66 
6 University, Government, or NGO67 
7 Start-up, pre-product 
8 Product company 
9 Individual inventor(s) 
10 Undetermined 
11 Industry Consortium 
12 IP subsidiary of a product company 
 
Because many patents were owned at the time of suit by an entity of one 
class but actually asserted by an exclusive licensee of another, I identified 
each patent‘s owner and the party asserting each in litigation – i.e., the 
―patentee.‖   Consistent with others in the literature, the results I report 
below compare the NPE status of the party acting as patentee in court, 
whether that party is the owner or exclusive licensee.
68
  Figure 1 below 
shows the variance between patent ownership and responsibility for 
enforcement.  Notably, a significant number of NPE-owned patents were 
exclusively licensed to product producing patentees.  All university-owned 
patents in my sample, and more than half of the individually-owned patents, 
were at the time of assertion exclusively licensed to product companies that 
                                                 
65
 There is a fine line between Class 1 and Classes 3 and 4 because many acquired 
patents come from failed product companies and start-ups.  In this study, I categorized a 
patentee as Class 3 or Class 4 when the entity filing suit was the failed company itself, and 
Class 1 when the entity filing suit was a distinct IP-holding firm that acquired the patent, 
even if that firm‘s entire portfolio appeared to be salvaged from one failed company.  For 
example, I categorized T.M. Patents, LP – a firm created to hold patent assets from the  
failed Thinking Machines Corp – as Class 1, not Class 4.  Because there is only a minor 
distinction between a failed company that began to assert its patents in its own name and a 
failed company that first reorganized into an LLC or LP before doing the same, I report 
combined results below for Classes 1, 3-4.    
66
 In this class, and in Class 9, I included patents owned by licensing companies started 
by deceased inventors‘ heirs and patents owned by such heirs, respectively.  A number of 
patents were litigated by family members of the named inventor after the inventor‘s death.  
See, e.g., Black & Decker, Inc. v. Billy Star Holdings, Ltd., No. 08-CV-1261 (D. Minn) 
(suit filed with deceased inventor‘s son controlling patent-owning entity). 
67
 In my sample, all Class 6 patents were owned by universities. 
68
 See Extreme Value, supra note _, at 10 (categorizing ―the patent plaintiff‖). 
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acted as plaintiffs or declaratory-judgment defendants.
69
  Firms organized 
for the purposes of exploiting unused patents – patent acquisition firms, 
firms holding the IP assets of failed companies, and inventor-affiliated 
licensing firms – therefore account for almost two-thirds of all NPE asserted 
patents.
70
  More controversial NPEs account for just a small minority of 
NPE patents and do not drive the results reported below.
71
 
Finally, it is worth noting that my sample does not include any patents 
owned by Ronald Katz – i.e., Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, LP, a 
Class 5 patentee – or Jerome Lemelson – e.g., Lemelson Medical Education 
& Research Foundation, also Class 5 – though several litigated patents 
owned by both were issued within the study period.
72
  Katz and Lemelson 
are perhaps the two most famous and most prolific patent plaintiffs of all 
time, and have what can conservatively be described as an outsized impact 
on patent litigation statistics.  Both, and especially Katz, have a history of 
filing extremely large numbers of suits against extremely large numbers of 
accused infringers, and authors of previous studies have grappled with 
whether to exclude their statistics.
73
  The addition of even one Katz patent 
                                                 
69
 In addition, one individually-owned patent was asserted by a patent acquisition firm.  
Only one patent originally owned by a university found its way into the hands of another 
NPE.  See BioTechnology, LLC v. CIBA Vision Corp., No. 09-CV-3947 (E.D. Pa.) 
(Drexel University joined as ―involuntary plaintiff‖). 
Additionally, a few patents (four total, or less than one percent of the entire sample) 
were transferred in between suits to entities of a different class.  One patent initially 
asserted by a product company was later assigned to an IP-holding subsidiary.  Another 
was asserted by a product company that subsequently failed and was reborn as a litigation-
oriented enterprise.  A third was asserted by an individual inventor who later assigned the 
patent to an acquisition firm.  And, a final patent was initially asserted by a start-up 
company that subsequently failed and assigned the patent to a patent acquisition firm.  In 
order to compare litigation timing strictly across entity type, I divided these patents into 
multiple data points, one for each period of litigation supervised by a new entity type. 
70
 See Ball & Kesan, supra note _, at *2 (noting that ―licensing firms [are] the most 
common candidate for the ‗troll‘ moniker‖); Extreme Value, supra note _, at 24 (referring 
to ―licensing companies in the business of buying up and enforcing patents‖ as ―‗trolls‘ by 
virtually anyone‘s definition‖).  Collectively, these patentee types account for 54 of 83 
NPE-asserted patents, or 65.1%.  See Tbl. 7, infra.  Patents acquired (from failed or 
operating companies) account for 35 of 83, or 42.2%.  Patents asserted by inventor-
affiliated licensing companies account for the remaining 19 of 83, or 22.9%. 
71
 See supra note _.  As discussed in greater detail infra, virtually all individually-
owned patents were asserted relatively early in the patent term and, therefore, also do not 
drive the results reported below. 
72
 Katz and Lemelson asserted at least 8 patents issued during the study period.  U.S. 
Patent No. 5,297,197 (Katz); U.S. Patent No. 5,259,023 (same); U.S. Patent No. 5,255,309 
(same); U.S. Patent No. 5,251,252 (same); U.S. Patent No. 5,224,153 (same); U.S. Patent 
No. 5,218,631 (same); U.S. Patent No. 5,283,641 (Lemelson); U.S. Patent No. 5,231,259 
(same). 
73
 In a study of patents litigated eight or more times between 2000 and 2007, Katz 
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to my sample – e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,255,309 or U.S. Patent No. 
5,251,252, both of which have been asserted in about eighty suits – would 
have significantly increased the per suit and per assertion results reported 
below. 
 
Figure 1: Patent Owner – Patentee Histogram74 
 
 
4. Technology, Industry Category 
 
Lastly, I categorized each patent by technology focus and industry.  
Rather than use the PTO classification system, I followed Allison, Lemley, 
and Walker‘s taxonomy, which includes nine nonexclusive technology 
categories and thirteen nonexclusive industry categories listed below in 
Table 3.
75
 
                                                                                                                            
alone accounted for 60% of all studied lawsuits.  See Extreme Value, supra note _, at 26 
(noting the enormity of the ―Katz effect,‖ but ultimately deciding to retain Katz-related 
statistics). 
74
 These statistics generally comport with Colleen Chien‘s findings in a study of 
litigated patents issued in 1990, though I find a higher percentage of product company-
asserted patents.  See Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, supra note _, at *31-32 (finding 
in a study of 667 litigated patents issued in 1990 that 73% were litigated by product 
companies, 9% by ―patent assertion entities,‖ and 18% by individual inventors).  For the 
precise breakdown of NPE-asserted patents among the various classes, see Table 7, infra. 
75
 Allison, Lemley, and Walker‘s taxonomy, is explained in detail at Extreme Value, 
supra note _, at 6-10.  In prior work, Allison and Lemley have criticized the PTO‘s rather 
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Table 3: Technology and Industry Areas 
 
Technology Categories Industry Categories 
1. Software 1.   Computer 
2. Pure software 2.   Semiconductor 
3. Software business method 3.   Electronics 
4. Mechanical 4.   Medical 
5. Electronics 5.   Pharmaceutical 
6. Optics 6.   Biotechnology 
7. Imaging 7.   Chemical 
8. Biotechnology 8.   Communications 
9. Chemistry 9.   Transportation 
 10. Energy and utility services 
 11. Financial 
 12. Consumer goods and services 
 13. Construction 
 
Much of this data I have reserved for future research.  I do, however, 
report results below that distinguish among ―software,‖ ―high-tech,‖ 
―medical device,‖ ―pharmaceutical,‖ and ―biotech‖ patents.  Software 
patents, as used in this study, are those that fall within technology 
categories 1, 2, or 3, regardless of the industry in which they are 
employed.
76
  I give the label ―high-tech‖ to all patents covering computer, 
electronics, and/or telecommunications technology, including all software 
patents.  These patents generally fall within one or more of technology 
categories 1-3 and 5-7 and one or more of industry categories 1-4, 8-9.  
Finally, medical device, pharmaceutical, and biotech patents are those that 
fall within industry categories 4, 5, and 6, respectively.  Medical device 
patents touch on almost every technology category, though most are strictly 
or primarily mechanical in nature.  Some medical device patents, for 
example those covering computer- or electronically-assisted medical 
procedures, overlap with technology categories 1-3 and 5-7. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
byzantine classification system.  Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of 
Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2114 (2000). 
76
 Categories 2 and 3 are both subsets of category 1.  Extreme Value, supra note _, at 
6-7. 
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II.  RESULTS  
 
A.  Two Patent Terms 
 
I begin by investigating the relative ages of patents asserted by 
practicing and non-practicing entities.  To make this comparison, however, I 
must adjust for the fact that patents in my sample may have one of two 
different patent terms.  Patents in this study issued just before a major event 
in the history of U.S. patent law: the United States‘ 1994 ratification of 
GATT/TRIPs.
77
  To comply with these new international obligations, 
Congress changed the way U.S. patent law calculates the patent term for the 
first time since 1952.
78
  Patent reform legislation effective June 8, 1995 
altered the patent term from seventeen years from issue to twenty years 
from filing.
79
  Importantly for this study, this same legislation created a 
hybrid calculation for patents caught in this transition – i.e., unexpired 
patents issued before or pending on June 8, 1995, a group that includes 
every patent issued during the study period.
80
  These patents receive a term 
of either seventeen year from issue or twenty years from filing, whichever is 
longer.
81
  
Thus, barring invalidation or a missed maintenance fee payment, every 
patent in this study received a term of at least 17 years from issuance and at 
least 20 years from filing.
82
  The percentage of patents falling in each 
category is shown below in Table 4.  With the average duration of 
prosecution among studied patents near three years – for product companies 
and NPEs alike – these two calculations provide a quite similar term of 
protection for the bulk of patents.
83
  Nonetheless, to account for these slight 
                                                 
77
 In full, the ―General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods.‖  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81, 83-111 (1994). 
78
 The U.S. also committed to make this change in a contemporaneous executive 
agreement with Japan.  See Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 
supra note _, at 370, n.7. 
79
 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1995) with 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). 
80
 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1). 
81
 Id. 
82
 Patents that issued from applications less than three years‘ old receive a longer term 
under the 20-years-from-filing formulation.  Patents that issued from applications spending 
longer than three years at the PTO received a longer term under the 17-years-from-issue 
formulation. 
83
 On average product company patents spent 1,095 days (exactly 3 years) at the PTO; 
NPE patents spent 1,112 days on average, just over two weeks longer. 
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variations in patent term, I primarily report patent age measured in years 
prior to expiration, whether 17 years from issue or 20 years from filing.
84
 
 
Table 4: Patent Term 
 
Event Percentage of Patents 
Possible Term Actual Expiration 
20-years from filing 68.5% 55.7% 
17-years from issue 31.5% 25.7% 
Failure to pay 
maintenance fee 
- 14.7% 
Invalidated - 3.9% 
 
B.  Per Patent 
 
Figures 2 and 3 below show the relative timing of patent enforcement 
across NPE status on a per patent basis.  Figure 2 is a histogram of the dates 
on which patents were litigated for the first time, measured backward from 
the date each patent‘s term ended.  Figure 3 is a histogram of the dates on 
which litigation asserting patents ended once and for all, again measured 
backward from patents‘ expiration.  The results are dramatic.  As shown 
below in Table 5, on average product companies finish enforcing their 
patents before NPEs even begin. 
It is clear from these Figures that product company litigation and NPE 
litigation follow opposing trends.  Product companies overwhelmingly 
begin litigating their patents early in the patent term, on average more than 
12 years before expiration,
85
 and overwhelmingly finish with many years of 
patent life remaining, on average more than 9.
86
  NPEs, on the other hand, 
begin litigating their patents much later in the term, less than 9 years from 
expiration on average,
87
 and overwhelmingly finish in the final few years of 
the patent term, with on average about 4.5 years (and a median of under 3 
years) remaining.
88
 
                                                 
84
 When measuring backwards from expiration, I use the date the term expired or 
would have expired for patents that fell into the public domain prematurely. 
85
 12.23 years, with a standard deviation of 4.31 years and a median of 12.7 years. 
86
 9.42 years, with a standard deviation of 4.73 years and a median of 9.92 years. 
87
 8.84 years, with a standard deviation of 4.75 years and a median of 8.46 years. 
88
 4.56 years, with a standard deviation of 4.78 years and a median of 2.79.  These 
statistics are comparable to prior estimates.  See Risch, supra note _, at 27 (finding, among 
the most litigious NPEs, an average delay of 8.5 years between issue and filing a first 
complaint); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 237 (1998) (finding that patent suits, on average, are 
resolved 12.3 years from the application date of the patent-in-suit). 
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These opposing trends intersect one another about three to five years 
prior to expiration.  With five years of patent life remaining, product 
companies have started (and in most cases finished) litigating over 94% of 
their patents, while over 30% of NPE patents have not yet been asserted.  
With three-and-a-half years of term remaining, product companies have 
finished asserting more than 86% of their patents, while more than 59% of 
NPE patents remain in, or will soon enter, the court system.  Though just 
one-fifth of all patentees, NPEs asserted almost 57% of patents litigated for 
the first time within five years of expiration and over 65% of patents in 
litigation resolved within three-and-a-half years of expiration. 
 
Figure 2: Years from First Suit to Expiration
89
 
 
  
                                                 
89
 For a breakdown of specific findings across patentee classes and the patent term, see 
Table 7, infra. 
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Figure 3: Years from Cessation of All Litigation to Expiration 
 
Data on the chain of ownership of these litigated patents, also reported 
below in Table 5, sheds some light on NPEs‘ relatively long delay in filing 
suit.  NPE asserted patents, particularly those acquired from other firms 
(failed or otherwise), change hands more frequently over a longer period of 
time than their counterparts litigated by product companies.  Moreover, 
once they reach the patentee who will ultimately assert them in court, NPE 
asserted patents sit for another three-and-a-half years on average before 
litigation is filed.    
As a whole, NPE-asserted patents are three times more likely to have 
changed hands between issue and enforcement.
90
  Classes 1, 3 and 4, 
collectively, are more than four times as likely to have been transferred 
between owners post-issue and, among assigned patents, have changed 
hands roughly 50% more times per patent.  Patents do not reach acquisition 
firms until about nine years after issue, and these firms wait almost three 
additional years on average before filing suit.  Other NPEs fare little better.  
Inventor-affiliated licensing companies generally do not form until about 
six years after issue and, on average, wait more than five additional years 
before filing suit.  And, patents reach product companies‘ licensing 
                                                 
90
 These statistics likely understate the variance in rates at which product-company and 
NPE patents are sold because many product company assignments are the result of 
mergers, acquisitions and spin-offs involving all the patent owner‘s assets, not just its 
patent rights.  See Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, supra note _, at *24.  
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subsidiaries on average about eight years after issue and sit for an additional 
four years before assertion.  Individual inventors, by contrast, file suit 
quickly on almost the exact same timeline as product companies. 
Thus, with the notable exception of those litigated by individuals, NPE 
asserted patents take a long, circuitous path from the PTO to the courthouse 
that covers more than a decade and includes more than two prior owners.  
This finding strongly suggests that it makes little sense to discuss the 
percentage of NPE litigation among all suits filed.  NPEs do not obtain 
patents until the patent term is half-spent and hold their patents for years 
more before filing suit, perhaps while waiting for emerging industries to 
mature.
91
  Thus, the bare statistic that NPEs account for only about one-fifth 
of all patents litigated obscures the fact that NPEs account for the majority 
of patents litigated in the final few years of the term – the only portion of 
the term when they are active.  
 
Table 5: Litigation Timing, Per Patent, and Assignment History 
 
 Prod Co 
(Class 8) 
All NPEs 
 
p-value
92
 Acquired/Failed 
(Classes 1, 3-4) 
Inventor Lic Co 
(Class 5) 
Individual 
(Class 9) 
IP Subsid 
(Class 12) 
Avg litigation start:        
    Until expiration 12.2 yrs 8.8 < 0.001 7.32 7.92 12.2 8.02 
    From issue 5.6 yrs 8.9 < 0.001 10.2 9.96 5.6 10.1 
    From filing 8.6 yrs 11.9 < 0.001 13.69 12.42 8.56 12.41 
Avg litigation end:        
    Until expiration 9.4 yrs 4.6 < 0.001 1.99 3.27 9.26 5.29 
    From issue 8.4 yrs 13.2 < 0.001 15.53 14.59 8.53 12.83 
    From filing 11.4 yrs 16.2 < 0.001 19.02 17.05 11.5 15.15 
Percent assigned93 20% 62% < 0.001 86%94 71% 14%95 80% 
Avg, per assigned: 
    Total # assigns 
 
1.45 
 
1.94 
 
< 0.001 
 
2.1 
 
1.67 
 
1 
 
2.25 
    Issue to 1st assign 3.9 yrs 5.4 0.013 5.7 4.1 7.2 5.8 
    1st to last assign 1.5 yrs 2.4 0.030 3.0 1.7  0 1.9 
    last assign to assert 2.9 yrs 3.5 0.056 2.8 5.2 2.3 3.9 
 
                                                 
91
 Again, my findings comport with prior estimates in the literature.  Risch, supra note 
_, at 28 (finding that, among patents asserted by the ten most litigious NPEs, ―[t]he mean 
time between patent issuance and the last assignment recorded98 was 2581 days (7.07 
years)‖); see also Mann, supra note _, at 1027. 
92
 Unless indicated otherwise, all p-values were calculated using the Pearson‘s chi-
square test function of Stata v.11.1. 
93
 As explained above, these statistics attempt to count only ―true‖ transfers of 
ownership, not mere name changes or minor corporate reorganizations (both of which 
appear in PTO assignment records). 
94
 The rate is not 100% because five patents remained in the name of their failed 
owner. 
95
 The rate is not 0% because there were three assignments between joint inventors – 
i.e., to consolidate ownership in one inventors‘ name. 
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C.  Per Suit and Per Assertion 
 
In fact, the results reported above also understate the true magnitude of 
late-term NPE enforcement.  As shown below in Table 6, NPEs are far 
more litigious on average than product companies.  Overall, NPEs file more 
than twice as many suits per patent and assert each patent against more than 
four times as many alleged infringers.  Moreover, NPEs are even more 
litigious with patents asserted especially late in the patent term.  Per patent 
litigated in the last two years of its term, NPEs file more than three 
additional suits against almost seventeen additional infringers.
96
 
 
Table 6: Relative Litigiousness 
 
 Product Co. NPE p-value 
Overall:    
Suits/Patent
97
 1.5 3.4 < 0.001 
Assertions/Patent 2.9 11.8 < 0.001 
Lit complete, > 2 yrs from exp:    
Suits/Patent 1.4 1.6  
Assertions/Patent 2.7 5.1  
In lit, < 2 yrs from exp:
98
    
Suits/Patent 2.5 6.0  
Assertions/Patent 5.0 21.9  
 
p-value 
 
 
< 0.001 
< 0.001 
 
0.008 
0.020 
 
 
Taking into account NPEs‘ relative litigiousness, NPEs‘ dominance of 
late-term patent litigation grows considerably, as does their share of all suits 
and all assertions.  Figure 4 below is a histogram of lawsuit filing dates for 
all suits filed within 6 years of the patent-in-suit‘s expiration.99  Figure 5 is 
a histogram of lawsuit end dates for all suits resolved within 6 years of the 
patent-in-suit‘s expiration.  Both show a significant increase in NPEs‘ late-
                                                 
96
 Naturally, both product companies and NPEs assert their oldest patents still in 
litigation more times than average. 
97
 Some studied patents were asserted together in the same suit, and all ―per suit‖ data 
reported infra accounts for this fact.  The rates reported in this Table, however, report the 
average number of suits in which each patent was asserted, whether or not another studied 
patent was asserted in the same suit.  
98
 Results are not uniformly significant at three years and beyond.  At two-and-a-half-
years, results are all significant at a 93% confidence level or better (i.e., p-value < 0.07).  
99
 In future versions of this study, I plan to extend this data back beyond six years. 
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term domination viewed on a per suit basis.  NPEs account for the majority 
of all new patent filings in four of the last five years of the patent term and 
account for more than 62% of all patent suits filed within five years of the 
patent-in-suit‘s expiration.  NPEs similarly account for the majority of 
patent suits resolved within each of the last four years of the patent term and 
account for more than 67% of all patent suits resolved within three years of 
the patent-in-suit‘s expiration. 
 
Figure 4: Years from Each Suit’s Filing  
to Patent-in-Suit’s Expiration 
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Figure 5: Years from Each Suit’s Resolution 
to Patent-in-Suit’s Expiration 
 
 
Finally, viewed per accused infringer – or per ―assertion‖ – NPEs‘ 
domination of late-term patent litigation becomes even more overwhelming.   
Figure 6 below is a histogram of filing dates for all assertions filed within 6 
years of the asserted patent‘s expiration.  Figure 7 is a histogram of 
resolution dates for all assertions resolved within six years of the patent-in-
suit‘s expiration.  The results shown in both figures are especially dramatic.  
NPEs account for the majority of all new patent assertions in each of the 
last six years of the patent term and account for more than 82% of all patent 
assertions filed within five years of the patent-in-suit‘s expiration.  NPEs 
similarly account for the majority of patent assertions resolved within each 
of the last five years of the patent term and account and more than 82% of 
all patent assertions resolved within three years of expiration.   
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Figure 6: Years from Each Assertion’s Filing  
to Patent-in-Suit’s Expiration 
 
 
Figure 7: Years from Each Assertion’s Resolution  
to Patent-in-Suit’s Expiration 
 
 
As summarized below in Table 7, properly viewed among all patents 
litigated at a similar age (rather than all litigated patents), NPE-asserted 
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patents are the overwhelmingly dominant source of patent litigation in the 
final years of the patent term.  NPEs assert the majority of new patents, file 
about two-thirds of new suits, and file over four-fifths of new assertions in 
the final five years of the patent term, and are responsible for virtually 
identical percentages of patents enforced, and suits and assertions resolved, 
within three years of expiration.  Moreover, the lionshare of late-term NPE 
litigation is brought by patent acquisition firms, firms holding the IP 
remnants of failed companies, and inventor-affiliated licensing firms.  
Collectively, these classes account for about 90% of NPE suits ongoing 
within three years of the patent-in-suit‘s expiration.  Thus, while prior 
studies may have shown that NPEs file ―a small fraction of all patent 
infringement suits,‖100 my results indicate that NPEs, and precisely those 
NPEs most associated with litigation abuse,
101
 are responsible for an 
enormous fraction of infringement claims brought late in the patent term, 
precisely when litigation abuse seems most likely.
102
 
  
Table 7: Late-Term Litigation Summary 
 
 Prod Co 
(Class 8) 
All NPEs p-value Acquired/Failed 
(Classes 1, 3-4) 
Inventor Lic Co 
(Class 5) 
New Startup 
(Class 7) 
Individual 
(Class 9) 
IP Subsid. 
(Class 12) 
Total Patents 326 83  35 19 1 21 7 
   Enforcement ceased  
      w/in 3 yrs of exp 
32 45 < 0.001 28 12 0 2 3 
   Enforcement initiated 
      w/in 5 yrs of exp 
 
19 25 < 0.001 15 6 0 2 2 
Total Suits103 447 253  161 42 1 36 13 
   Suits resolved 
      w/in 3 yrs of exp 
54 111 < 0.001 83 16 0 5 7 
   Suits filed 
      w/in 5 yrs of exp 
 
48 79 < 0.001 53 16 0 4 6 
Total Assertions 949 978  655 179 3 81 60 
   Assertions resolved 
      w/in 3 yrs of exp 
123 568 < 0.001 393 108 0 32 35 
   Assertions filed 
      w/in 5 yrs of exp 
102 471 < 0.001 313 122 0 29 7 
 
D.  Technology Areas and Litigation Outcomes 
 
The results reported above suggest that the final few years of the patent 
term primarily benefit NPEs.  Compared to product companies, NPEs as a 
whole, and especially firms that hold patents purely for enforcement, assert 
                                                 
100
 See supra note _. 
101
 See supra note _.  
102
 See Risch, supra note _, at 27 (noting that ―the longer [NPEs] wait, the more like 
trolls their behavior might appear‖). 
103
 This data was adjusted to account for the fact that some studied patents were 
asserted together in one suit. 
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more patents, in more suits, and against more accused infringers late in the 
patent term.  In fact, as Table 6 shows, NPEs actually become more 
aggressive as their patents age.  NPE status and sheer litigiousness, 
however, are not the only traits commonly associated with patent ―trolls.‖  
In this section, I investigate the prevalence of two other common troll-
related characteristics: a fondness for asserting high-tech patents and a 
penchant for losing when forced to adjudicate their infringement claims on 
the merits.   
In essence, these statistics further measure the extent to which NPEs 
take advantage of the tail end of the patent term.  Product lifecycles in the 
high-tech industry are notoriously short.  Computing power, after all, 
doubles roughly every two years.
104
  Thus, high-tech patents are by far the 
most likely to be grossly out of date – technologically speaking – when 
asserted close to two decades after their filing date.  Additionally, the rate at 
which NPEs prove their infringement allegations gives some indication 
whether NPEs are relying on particularly strained claim interpretations to 
stretch aging patents so that they arguably cover more advanced technology.  
Data on the diversity of litigated patents, shown below in Table 8, 
shows that high-tech patents play an out-sized role in NPE litigation, and in 
late-term litigation as a whole.  Overall, about 64% of NPE-asserted patents 
cover computer- or electronics-related inventions, and almost 40% cover 
software-related inventions.
105
  By contrast, just over 40% of product 
company-asserted patents cover high-tech inventions and just 25% cover 
software-related subject matter.
106
  On a per suit and per assertion basis, the 
high-tech share of product company litigation remains roughly steady, 
while the high-tech share of NPE litigation jumps to 80% of suits and just 
under 80% of assertions.
107
 
                                                 
104
 This observation, which has held true for decades, is known as ―Moore‘s Law.‖  
See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components Onto Integrated Circuits, 
ELECTRONICS, Apr. 19, 1965, at 114, 115 (predicting that computing power will double 
approximately every two years). 
105
 Michael Risch, who used PTO classification numbers to define high-tech subject 
matter, found that 36% of patents asserted by the ten most litigious NPEs were high-tech 
inventions.  Risch, supra note _, at 18 (finding also that the majority of high-tech patents in 
his study were software patents). 
106
 The variance between product companies‘ and NPEs‘ enforcement of software 
patents is statistically significant per patent (p-value = 0.007), per suit (p-value < 0.001), 
and per assertion (p-value < 0.001).  The variance between product companies‘ and NPEs‘ 
enforcement of other high-tech patents is (barely) statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence level per patent (p-value = 0.096) and not statistically significant per suit, but is 
significant per assertion (p-value = 0.006).  
107
 As shown below in Table 8, the variance between product companies‘ and NPEs‘ 
share of all four technology categories is only statistically significant on a per assertion 
basis (software p-value < 0.001; other high-tech p-value = 0.006; medical device p-value < 
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Among patents asserted in the final three years of their term, the rate of 
high-tech subject matter increases – surprisingly, for all patentees.  That is, 
high-tech patents account for an outsized percentage of patent claims filed 
by product companies and NPEs alike.
108
  In fact, in the final three years of 
the patent term, the high-tech gap between NPEs and product companies 
narrows considerably – not because the high-tech share of NPE litigation 
shrinks (it grows to 86% of assertions
109
), but rather because the high-tech 
share of product company litigation skyrockets to exceed 72% of 
assertions.
110
   
Finally, turning to data on litigation outcomes shown below in Table 
9,
111
 I find that NPEs lose at a higher rate than product companies when 
their infringement claims are adjudicated and, again, that this variance 
increases among patents litigated late in the term.  Because so few patents 
were adjudicated, however, the statistical significance of these findings is 
less than ideal.
112
  Overall, more than 56% of adjudicated NPE patents were 
found not infringed by a judge or jury, compared to just under 30% of 
adjudicated product company patents.
113
  Similarly, product companies 
                                                                                                                            
0.001; biotech-pharmaceutical p-value < 0.001). 
108
 The prevalence of high-tech litigation in the final few years of the patent term, 
together with the large share of NPE litigation involving high-tech products, could suggest 
that my litigation timing findings merely reflect the fact that high-tech patents tend to be 
litigated late in the patent term.  My data directly contradicts this hypothesis, however.  
Product companies asserting high-tech patents litigate those patents far earlier than their 
NPE counterparts.  Among all high-tech patents, I find that product companies begin 
enforcement with an average of 11.72 years of patent term remaining, while NPEs begin 
with just 8.79 years remaining.  This difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.039).  
Among the same group of patents, product companies finish enforcement with an average 
of 9.38 years of term remaining, while NPEs conclude their enforcement efforts with just 
3.72 years of term left.  Again, this difference is highly statistically significant (p-value < 
0.001).  Looking at software patents only, I find similar results.  On average, product 
companies begin enforcement with 11.97 years of term remaining and finish with 8.84 
years of term left.  On average, NPEs begin with 9.34 years of term remaining and 
conclude just 3.19 years before expiration.  The variance of both statistics is significant at a 
90% confidence interval or better (p-value = 0.095 and p-value = 0.001, respectively). 
109
 This growth is statistically significant among software claims (p-value = 0.005) and 
among other high-tech claims (p-value = 0.001).  
110
 While growth in the number of product-company software claims is not statistically 
significant, growth in the number of other high-tech claims is highly significant (p-value < 
0.001).  Growth in the number of product-company high-tech suits is also significant (p-
value < 0.001); growth in the number of high-tech patents enforced by product-companies 
is significant only at a 94% confidence level (p-value = 0.059).  
111
 Again, the data in Table 9 reports whether each patent was ever found infringed, 
not infringed, or invalid at the district court level before appeal.  See supra note _. 
112
 A substantial percentage of late-filed suits are still ongoing, and may well add data 
in the coming months that will strengthen (or weaken) these results. 
113
 As shown below in Table 9, this difference is statistically significant.  
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proved infringement of almost half their adjudicated patents, while NPEs 
proved infringement of just a quarter.
114
  Moreover, the variance between 
product companies‘ and NPEs‘ success at proving infringement grows with 
time, though not because NPEs become worse (to a statistically significant 
degree anyway).  Rather, product companies become more successful.  
Among adjudicated patents litigated in the final three years of the patent 
term, product companies proved infringement of 70%, a statistically 
significant increase at a 92% confidence level,
115
 while NPEs fail to prove 
infringement or establish validity of greater than 70%.
116
 
 
  
                                                 
114
 This variance is only significant at a 90% confidence level (p-value = 0.091).  Also, 
note that I do not count default judgments as ―adjudications.‖ 
115
 Chi-square p-value = 0.076; Fisher‘s exact p-value = 0.074. 
116
 One NPE asserted patent was found both invalid and not infringed.  One possible 
confounding factor here is that, over time, it has become easier for accused infringers to 
locate prior art that restricts patentees‘ ability to advance broad claim interpretations.  See, 
e.g., F. Russell Denton, Plumb Lines Instead of a Wrecking Ball: A model for Recalibrating 
Patent Scope, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 24 (2008) (noting that prior art searching ―has 
become easier because of advances in search technology, online bandwidth, a growth 
industry in database searches . . . , and the appearance of free searchable PTO online 
databases, not to mention other public online databases.‖); cf. Allison & Lemley, The 
Growing Complexity, supra note _, at 138 (discussing how computer searching may have 
improved patent examiners‘ ability to locate prior art).  Note, however, that the invalidity 
rates reported below in Table 9 do not appear to support this hypothesis. 
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Table 8: Technology Areas 
 
  Product Co.   NPE  
 Patent Suit Assertion Patent Suit Assertion 
    *p-value < 0.05   **0.1 > p-value > 0.05117 
Overall:     
% software 24.9 21 21.5 39.8* 62.8* 57.2* 
% other high-tech 16.3 15.7 16.3 24.1** 17 21.3* 
% medical device 8.6118 7.2 10.8 13.3119 5.1 5.9* 
% bio-pharma 5.5 6.9 6.1 0* 0* 0* 
    *p-value < 0.05   **0.1 > p-value > 0.05
120 
Lit complete, > 3 yrs from 
exp: 
    
% software 24.4 20.6 21.2 31.6 62 52 
% other high-tech 15.1 12.7 11.5 23.7 16.2 16.1 
% medical device 8.3 7.1 11.7 10.5 5.6 4.9 
% bio-pharma 4.5 5.1 4.6 0 0 0 
In lit, < 3 Yrs from exp:       
% software 28.1 24.1 23.6 46.7 64 60.9* 
% other high-tech 28.1** 37* 48.8* 24.4 18 25* 
% medical device 12.5 7.4 4.1* 15.6121 4.5 6.7 
% bio-pharma 15.6* 20.4* 16.3* 0 0 0 
 
                                                 
117
 Comparing Product Company versus NPE patents, suits, and assertions. 
118
 Out of 28 total that cover medical devices, ten patents, which collectively account 
for 11 suits and 15 assertions (out of 35 and 102 total, respectively, involving medical 
devices), are also high-tech related; 5 of the 10, which account for 5 suits and 6 assertions, 
are software-related. 
119
 Out of 11 total that cover medical devices, four patents, which collectively account 
for 7 suits and 24 assertions (out of 15 and 58 total, respectively, involving medical 
devices), are also high-tech related; 1 of the 4, which accounts for 3 suits and 6 assertions, 
is software related. 
120
 Comparing patents, suits, and assertions resolved more than and less than three 
years before expiration. 
121
 Two medical device patents, which collectively account for three suits and ten 
assertions, are also high-tech related. 
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Table 9: Litigation Outcomes 
 
 Product Co. NPE p-value 
Overall:    
  Adjudicated 19.6% 19.3  
   Infringed 48.4%122 25 0.091 
   Non-infringed 29.7% 56.3 0.046 
   Invalid 29.7%123 25124  
Lit complete, > 3 yrs from exp: *p-value < 0.05   **0.1 > p-value > 0.05
125 
Adjudicated 18.2% 18.9  
   Infringed 43.4% 28.6  
   Non-infringed 32.1% 57.1  
   Invalid 28.3% 28.6  
In lit, < 3 yrs from exp:    
Adjudicated 34.4%* 20  
   Infringed 72.7%** 22.2  
   Non-infringed 18.2% 55.6  
   Invalid 36.4% 22.2  
 
III. IMPLICATIONS  
 
The results presented above demonstrate that NPEs play a more 
important role in the patent system than previously recognized, and a role 
that only becomes fully apparent when NPE litigation is examined in 
relation to the age of litigated patents.  In short, while NPEs do not assert 
the majority of litigated patents or even file the majority of patent suits, they 
play an extraordinarily dominant role in patent litigation resolved or filed in 
the waning years of the patent term. 
 
A.  NPEs are Mostly Not Technology Disseminators;  
Product Co.’s are Not Entirely Blameless 
 
What does this fact mean for our opinion of NPEs?  For one, it serves as 
one more nail in the coffin of NPEs‘ claims that they play a ―central role in 
helping commercial entities obtain the rights to use valuable technologies 
that produce new and beneficial products.‖126  NPEs asserting patents filed 
by others roughly two decades ago cannot credibly claim that they are 
championing the rights of their accused infringers‘ contemporaneous 
                                                 
122
 One product company asserted patent was found both infringed and not infringed in 
different cases. 
123
 Four product company asserted patents were adjudicated before being invalidated.  
Two were found infringed, and two were found not infringed. 
124
 One NPE asserted patent was found both not infringed and invalid. 
125
 Comparing the outcomes of patent enforcement resolved more than and less than 
three years before expiration. 
126
 John C. Paul, et al., Patent Trolls: A Stereotype Causes a Backlash Against Patents 
and Licensing, 41 LES NOUVELLES 224, 232 (2006). 
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competitors.  Similarly, with the notable exception of individual inventors, 
NPEs asserting their own patents are by no means rushing to the courthouse 
to vindicate their own rights soon after their patents issue.  Instead, NPEs 
appear to be engaged in classic ―troll-like‖ behavior: suing the better part of 
a well-established industry for infringement of an aging patent, generally 
one covering software or high-tech subject matter, and overwhelmingly 
losing when pushed to prove their infringement allegations.
127
 
NPEs‘ role as vindicators of hard-fought patent rights becomes even 
less plausible taking into consideration the breakdown of NPE-asserted 
patents by technology and industry.  Overall, almost 64% of NPE patents 
cover high-tech subject matter – about 40% are software related.  Worse 
still, more than 80% of NPE-filed suits assert high-tech patents, and more 
than 65% have software-related claims.  None cover pharmaceutical or 
biotech inventions, and less than 14% cover medical devices.
128
  Among 
NPE patents asserted in suits ongoing within three years of their expiration, 
almost 47% are software patents and more than 70% are high-tech related.  
And, on a per assertion basis, 86% of NPE patent enforcement in the final 
three years of protection is high-tech focused.  In essence, where innovation 
is rapid and cheap, NPEs dominate, and where innovation is slow and 
expensive, NPEs are nowhere to be found. 
Interestingly, a significant portion of product company litigation 
ongoing in the waning years of the patent term fares little better.  Among 
product-company patents in litigation within three years of expiration, a 
large percentage (about 56%) cover high-tech invention.  On a per assertion 
basis, this rate jumps to over 70%.  Perhaps not surprisingly, upon closer 
examination, many of the suits responsible for this jump bear the hallmarks 
of troll litigation even though they were brought by a product-producing 
patentee.  Several are suits filed by failing (but not yet failed) companies 
hoping to keep their doors open just a little while longer.  Film and camera 
maker Kodak, for example, sued virtually every manufacturer of smart 
phones, seeking $1 billion in damages for infringement of an old software 
patent covering image preview technology.
129
  Encyclopedia Britannica 
                                                 
127
 The breadth and age of NPE patents could alternatively suggest that these patents 
are far from stale and, instead, cover inventions so ahead of their time that it not until years 
later that commercial applications (and thus products) emerged.  A growing body of 
scholarship, however, strongly suggests that ―pioneer‖ inventions of this sort do not exist.  
See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012); Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent 
Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006). 
128
 Many of these medical device patents, in turn, have a significant high-tech or 
software component.  See supra note _. 
129
 See Research in Motion, Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 08-CV-2075 (N.D. Tex.); 
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launched a similar patent offensive against, curiously enough, the GPS-
mapping industry for infringement of a notoriously broad software 
patent.
130
  Other suits were filed by product companies that acquired patent 
rights purely for the purposes of litigation.  Gemstar-TV Guide,
131
 for 
example, acquired the right to assert, among others, patents owned by 
former satellite-TV company SuperGuide in a long-running patent battle 
with the DVR industry and others.
132
  Several others suddenly asserted 
aging high-tech patents that had changed hands several times over a number 
of years, or asserted such patents against an entire industry.
133
  These suits, 
the likes of which do not occur earlier in the patent term, support one point 
                                                                                                                            
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Apple, Inc., No. 10-CV-6022 (W.D.N.Y.); RICH DUPREY, THE 
WORST STOCKS OF 2010: EASTMAN KODAK, THE MOTLEY FOOL, JAN. 21, 2010, 
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2010/01/21/the-worst-stocks-for-2010-eastman-
kodak.aspx (noting that Kodak ―sees its future as being little more than a patent troll‖ 
because ―[a]s its film business collapsed, Kodak was left with few options other than to 
turn to its patent portfolio to eke out a living‖); JASON MICK, KODAK DEMANDS OVER $1B 
USD FROM APPLE, RIM FOR ALLEGED INFRINGEMENT, DAILY TECH, MAR. 25, 2011, 
http://www.dailytech.com/Kodak+Demands+Over+1B+USD+From+Apple+RIM+for+All
eged+Infringement/article21228.htm (noting also that in recent years Kodak ―went on a 
patent binge, spending on patents and acquiring small startups‖ especially to ―beef up its 
digital imaging IP‖).  Kodak recently put more than 1,000 patents up for sale in hopes of 
generating $2 billion in revenues.  See Robert Stammers, Is Kodak Worth $3 Billion?, 
FORBES, Aug 30, 2011, available at  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/cfainstitute/2011/08/30/is-kodak-worth-3-billion/.  
130
 See Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Alpine Elec. of Am., Inc., No. 05-CV-359 
(W.D. Tex.); Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Magellan Navigation, Inc., No. 07-CV-787 
(W.D. Tex.); Posting of Mike Masnick to TechDirt, It Appears that the Encyclopedia 
Britannica Entry on Shaking Down GPS Providers with a Bogus Patent Needs Updating, 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100625/2351149966.shtml (June 28, 2010, 11:56). 
131
 Gemstar merged with TV Guide, Inc. in July 2000, and was subsequently acquired 
by Macrovision (now Rovi Corp.) in May 2008. 
132
 See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., No. 00-CV-144 (W.D.N.C.); In re 
Certain Set-Top Boxes & Components Thereof, No. 337-TA-454 (Int‘l Trade Comm.); 
RICHARD RAYSMAN, ET AL., EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW, VOL. 2 § 8.05[5] 
(2003) (describing how Gemstar ―expanded its portfolio of patents through various 
licensing arrangements‖ and began to enforce those rights aggressively in an effort to gain 
―a controlling position in the market for interactive programming guides,‖ a market which 
matured to include technology far more advanced than what was envisioned in Gemstar‘s 
―aging patent portfolio‖).   
133
 My sample included a number of high-tech patents originally assigned to AT&T 
Bell Labs that changed hands after the company‘s spin-off to Lucent and eventually found 
their way into court in the mid to late 2000s.  See U.S. Patent Nos. 5,298,047; 5,287,427; 
5,243,229; 5,235,659.  Another high-tech patent, owned by Anvik Corp., was asserted in 
12 suits against 35 defendants (essentially every flat-panel display/TV manufacturer) in the 
late 2000s.  U.S. Patent No. 5,285,236; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,233,629 (software patent 
that changed hands in 2009 and was asserted for the first time that same year in three suits 
against six defendants). 
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NPEs have made for years: product companies are just as capable of filing 
suspect patent suits as NPEs. 
 
B.  Patent Term or Maintenance Fee Reform 
 
Together, the suspect quality of litigation brought by NPEs and product 
companies late in the patent term suggests that Congress might enhance 
innovation by shortening the patent term by three years, or even longer.  In 
these final years of the patent term, product companies seem to have all but 
abandoned patents used to facilitate the introduction of new products years 
earlier.  Many of those product companies left litigating aging patents 
appear to have the same motives and characteristics attributed to their much 
maligned troll adversaries – and presumably impose the same social costs.  
All things equal,
134
 a three-year term reduction would impact almost 44% of 
all NPE suits,
135
 while affecting roughly 12% of product company suits.
136
  
On a per assertion basis, a three year term reduction could cut-short
137
 more 
than 32% of all NPE claims and eliminate almost 30% more,
138
 while 
cutting short fewer than 8% of product company assertions and eliminating 
just 5% more.
139
   
Though the majority of affected patents would merely expire during 
their final assertions (rather than before those are filed), there is good reason 
to believe the balance of power would still shift dramatically in these cases.  
Without live patents, patentees cannot seek permanent injunctions or 
ongoing royalties if they ultimately win their infringement claims.  The 
possibility of both remedies gives patentees leverage to hold-up accused 
infringers for outsized settlements.
140
 
                                                 
134
 Of course, all things might not remain equal following patent term reform.  See 
infra Part III.C. 
135
 Of 253 total NPE suits, 45 were filed in the last three years of the patent-in-suit‘s 
term and another 66 were resolved within the same time period though filed a bit earlier. 
136
 Of 447 total product company suits, 26 were filed in the last three years of the 
patent-in-suit‘s term and another 28 were resolved within the same time period though filed 
a bit earlier. 
137
 By ―cut-short,‖ I mean that the patent-in-suit would expire during litigation.  
Patentees could continue to litigate for past infringement, but would be precluded from 
receiving an injunction or ongoing royalty after winning summary judgment or at trial 
because the alleged infringer‘s future activities would no longer potentially infringe.  
138
 Of 978 total NPE claims, 290 were brought within three years of the patent-in-suit‘s 
expiration and another 278 were resolved during the same period but filed earlier.  
139
 Of 949 total product company claims, 48 were brought within three years of the 
patent-in-suit‘s expiration and another 75 were resolved during the same period but filed 
earlier. 
140
 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 1991 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion Over Ongoing Royalties, 
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Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that product companies 
could easily be, and as a practical matter would be, insulated from a term 
reduction to a degree greater than the statistics above suggest.  For one, any 
legislation reforming the patent term could exclude practicing patentees in 
the biotech, pharmaceutical, and medical device industries, which 
collectively assert about 28% of product-company patents litigated in the 
final three years of the patent term.  Unlike their high-tech counterparts, 
these patents cover well defined and well known products approved by the 
FDA, and are frequently litigated at the very end of the patent term against 
generic manufacturers seeking a leg up in the production of low-cost 
alternatives to successful name brand drugs, diagnostics, and devices.  
Would a term reduction harm incentives to produce more of these life-
saving inventions?  Perhaps not.  Pharmaceutical companies are 
exceedingly skillful at extending their market power over drugs by filing 
newer patents covering related subject matter – a process known as 
―evergreening.‖141  In fact, for this very reason, a term reduction would 
impact product companies far less than one might anticipate because, unlike 
NPEs, a product company can always file new patents covering improved, 
next-generation versions of its products.  That is, while a product company 
with an expired patent likely has recourse to additional similar patents, an 
NPE with an expired patent is out of luck and must purchase a replacement. 
In any event, it would be logistically simple to exclude medical, biotech, 
and pharmaceutical patents from any legislation curtailing late term patent 
rights because the PTO already has experience singling out such inventions 
for special treatment.  Current law already permits term extensions for 
patents covering products that require FDA approval.
142
  These existing 
                                                                                                                            
at *9-10 (working paper 2011) (noting, for example, that some courts have granted trebled 
ongoing royalties on the theory that adjudicated infringers who continue to sell the 
infringing products are ―willful‖ infringers).  Post eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388 (2006), the possibility that a successful NPE will receive injunctive relief is 
diminished, but certainly non-zero.  See Lily Lim & Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions 
Enjoined; Remedies Reconstructed, 25 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 787, 798 
(2009) (noting that post-eBay ―a patentee who directly competes in the marketplace with 
the infringing party gets an injunction 79.6% of the time, while an NPE‘s chance of an 
injunction falls precipitously to 33.3%‖). 
141
 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 345, 354 (2007) (―Examples include patents on ‗metabolites‘ 
(i.e., the products into which drugs are transformed in a patient‘s body); patents on 
intermediate products used in producing drugs; patents on new uses for drugs; and patents 
on new formulations or preparations.‖); see also Tamsen Valoir, Six Methods of Preserving 
Market Exclusivity, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Nov. 2006, at 12, 14. 
142
 35 U.S.C. §156 (enacted as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act).  Related sections of 
the Patent Act provide product-specific term increases.  See id. at §§ 155, 155A (providing 
additional protection to Aspartame and Forane).  Thus, while it may be exceedingly 
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provisions could be reformed to lower the bar for term extensions or, quite 
simply, to exclude patents owned by the makers of FDA-approved 
medicines, diagnostics, or devices from any term reduction reforms.
143
   
Excluding from the tally cases and assertions brought by 
pharmaceutical, biotech, and medical device firms, a modified three-year 
term reduction would impact less than 8% of all product-company suits and 
roughly 10% of assertions.
144
  Taking product-company ―trolling‖ into 
account would reduce this percentage even further.  Additionally excluding 
those suits and assertions brought by the troll-like product companies 
mentioned above, a three-year reduction in the patent term would disrupt 
less than 4% of ―legitimate‖ product company patent suits and less than 5% 
of all assertions.
145
 
 
C.  Limitations 
 
One thing this study cannot predict, however, is how patentees would 
adjust their litigation timing in response to a term reduction.  Though, as 
discussed above, patents often do not reach NPEs for years, a substantial 
component of NPE litigation delay is simply that: delay.  On average NPEs 
wait about 3.5 years to file suit after obtaining a patent.  In theory, then, 
most NPE enforcement could have been initiated years earlier.  Requiring 
NPEs to race to the courthouse would no doubt have significant benefits.  It 
would, for example, force some NPEs to litigate before the technology they 
accuse is irrevocably incorporated in technology standards or costly fixed 
investments, and therefore reduce the hold-up power many NPEs now 
enjoy.
146
  Nonetheless, the results reported above must be discounted to 
some extent by uncertainty about NPEs‘ ability to sue earlier. 
Further, while I have used the terms ―enforcement‖ and ―litigation‖ 
above interchangeably, the results of this study are only as strong as the 
degree to which the temporal bounds of litigation match those of all patent 
enforcement.  Because patent licenses negotiated outside the court system 
are almost always kept confidential, it is virtually impossible to measure the 
                                                                                                                            
difficult, if not impossible, to draw bright lines between many other industries, it appears to 
be relatively simple to separate this cohort of patents.  None of the pharmaceutical, biotech, 
or medical device patents in my sample received a term extension.  A list of extended 
patents is available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/terms/156.jsp. 
143
 Requiring the commercialization of a product would exclude NPE-asserted medical 
device patents (more than 13% of all NPE patents) from the benefit of any such reform.   
144
 Collectively, these patentees filed 15 suits, accounting for 25 assertions, resolved 
within three years of the patent-in-suit‘s expiration. 
145
 Collectively, these patentees filed 20 suits, accounting for 54 assertions, resolved 
within three years of the patent-in-suit‘s expiration. 
146
 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note _. 
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total level of patent enforcement that product companies undertake after 
ceasing litigation, that NPEs undertake before filing suit, and that all 
patentees undertake with patents that are never asserted in court.   
While the amount of each is certainly non-zero, there is also good 
reason to believe that this source of uncertainty is not fatal to studies of this 
kind.  First, while some NPEs do attempt to license their patents without 
litigation,
147
 they face at least one very strong incentive not to: the 
importance of forum selection.  A threatened product company can, and 
generally will if litigation seems imminent, file a declaratory judgment 
action in a favorable jurisdiction in an attempt to prevent the impending suit 
from proceeding in a patentee-friendly district.
148
  What it almost certainly 
won‘t do is closely review unsolicited license offers from small NPEs.149  
Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that the most sophisticated 
NPEs, especially those who are repeat players, adopt a litigate-first strategy, 
and that sophisticated product companies do, too, when confronted with 
serious NPE infringement claims.   
Unlike NPEs, however, product companies do have a history of dealing 
with one another outside the confines of litigation.  One reason is that patent 
litigation is notoriously costly, but especially so for accused infringers.  
This cost-asymmetry makes litigation attractive for NPEs who cannot be 
countersued for infringement, and unattractive for product companies who 
generally will be and, furthermore, will have to deal with their opponent 
repeatedly in the future.
150
  In addition to litigation expenses, competitors 
                                                 
147
 See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual 
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 517 (2003) (noting that E-Data, a company that 
―owns a patent which arguably covers financial transactions on the Internet,‖ reportedly 
sent demand letters to 75,000 alleged infringers before suing forty-one companies for 
patent infringement). 
148
 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic 
Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 920-21 (2001) (―In cases in which the 
defendant was able to choose the forum (as with declaratory judgment actions) rather than 
the patent holder (as in infringement suits), there was a significant difference in outcome: . 
. . . When the patent holder selects the forum, the patent holder wins 58% of the claims. 
When the accused infringer brings a declaratory judgment action and thereby chooses the 
forum, the patent holder win rate drops to 44%.‖).  But cf. Chester S. Chuang, Offensive 
Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (finding that declaratory judgment actions are a 
surprisingly ineffective means to avoid pro-patentee forums). 
149
 See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21-22 (noting 
that companies generally ignore patents in all stages of product development: when 
conducting research and design, when filing their own patents, when launching new 
products, and even after receiving initial cease-and-desist letters from patent owners). 
150
 See Crane, supra note _, at 286; Chistopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor 
Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 Yale J. L. & Tech. 52, 55 (2009) (―If a defendant is 
sued by one of these patent trolls, the alleged infringers do not have the usual retaliatory 
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face other strong incentives not to challenge each other‘s patents; for 
example, the fact that they bear the cost of the challenge but share the 
benefit of invalidation with the rest of the industry and future 
competitors.
151
  All of these factors suggest that, between product 
companies, patent litigation is generally a last resort used against especially 
recalcitrant competitors, not the first resort it is for NPEs.  Finally, at least 
among product companies that actively license their patent portfolios, it is 
standard practice to license relatively large pools of patents, rather than a 
select few individuals.
152
  Removing the oldest patents from a large pool 
seems unlikely to substantially reduce its value to a competitor looking to 
clear a path to commercialize a new, cutting edge product, and, accordingly, 
it would be disingenuous to attribute much, if any, of the value of such a 
license to the most aged patents in the pool.
153
 
                                                                                                                            
mechanism—the ability to assert their own patents in return—because the patent troll does 
not sell any products or offer any services which could infringe.‖). 
151
 Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: 
Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent 
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004) (―[A] challenger bears the 
cost of litigation but its rivals and downstream buyers will capture almost all the benefits of 
successful challenge . . . .‖). 
152
 See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 8-9 (2005) (―While large firms provide perhaps the most compelling example of 
patent portfolios in practice . . . we also find real world case studies of patenting behavior 
consistent with our theory among startups and acquisition-centric firms.  Indeed, the rise of 
patent portfolios in the business community has become so significant that portfolios have 
become the credo of firm value in the modern innovation environment.‖).   
153
 See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra, at 1 (―We find that for patents, the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts: the true value of patents lies not in their individual worth, 
but in their aggregation into a collection of related patents--a patent portfolio.‖). 
One additional limitation is also worth mentioning.  There is a perception among many 
in the patent community that the NPE business model is largely a recent phenomenon 
popularized after the burst of the dot-com bubble.  See, e.g., John A Marlott, NPEs and 
Pre-Litigation Considerations, 1020 PLI/Pat 453, 457 (2010).  If true, my findings on late-
term NPE litigation might be inflated by the fact that few NPEs were around prior to 2000 
to file suit on patents issued in earlier years.  Recent scholarship casts serious doubt the 
accuracy of this perception, however.  Michael Risch found that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, large-scale NPE operations date back to at least the mid-1980s, were very active 
in the 1990s, and in some instances markedly decreased their activity in the 2000s.  Risch, 
supra note _, at 15-16 (reporting that, of the ten most litigious NPEs since 2003, two filed 
their first suit in 1986, nine began operating in the 1990s, and three actually ceased filing 
suits altogether in the 2000s).  Risch does report a weak correlation between NPE patent 
issue date and shelf time prior to suit, but notes that this correlation is at least partly 
explained by selection effects.  Id. at 27-28 (finding among patents asserted by the ten most 
litigious NPEs a correlation of 0.23 between issue date and time to first suit, but 
acknowledging that his study includes only those recently issued patents that were litigated 
prior to 2010).  But cf. Chien, Of Trolls, supra note _ at 1604 (finding that NPEs‘ share of 
high-tech patent litigation increased overall between 2000 and 2008, despite the fact that it 
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D.  Maintenance Fee Reform 
 
Is the potential disruption of between 4 and 5% of product company 
assertions (44 claims in this study) worth trading for the potential 
elimination of 32% of NPE claims and the dilution of almost 30% more 
(568 total claims in this study)?  Perhaps not, given the limitations 
discussed above.  A less drastic reform, and one that has the added benefit 
of not violating the U.S.‘s obligations under GATT/TRIPS, would be to 
increase the frequency and magnitude of maintenance fee payments in the 
latter half of the patent term.  Today, patent owners are free from payment 
obligations less than twelve years after issue, not long after the tide of 
patent litigation shifts in NPEs‘ favor.154   
Congress could require additional annual fees for years nine through 
eleven and thirteen through sixteen (or longer) and, moreover, could 
substantially increase the fee required each year.
155
  Such a reform might 
very well result in the premature expiration of many patents that would 
otherwise end up in the hands of patent acquisition firms, while at the same 
time permitting product companies profiting from lucrative confidential 
licensing agreements to extend their patents up to twenty years from filing.  
Moreover, the rates at which patentees renew their patent rights late in the 
term would shed additional light on the private value of aging patents that 
                                                                                                                            
decreased between 2002 and 2005, but making no findings with respect to the ages of 
asserted patents). 
154
 Under current law, maintenance fees are due at 3.5 years ($980), 7.5 years ($2480), 
and 11.5 years ($4110).  37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)-(g).  Patentees that qualify as ―small entities‖ 
pay only half this amount.  Id.  
155
 See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1551-
52 (2005) (recommending annual maintenance fee payments); Francesca Cornelli & Mark 
Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND J. ECON. 197, 197 (1999) 
(finding that a sharper rise in patent renewal fees would increase welfare).  U.S. patent 
renewal requirements are far less onerous than those in place in many other countries.  
Annual maintenance fees are common in other countries.  See, e.g., EUROPEAN PATENT 
CONVENTION, Pt. III, Chp. 1, Art. 86, available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-
texts/html/epc/2010/e/ar86.html (―Renewal fees for the European patent application 
[recognized in 38 member states] . . . shall be due in respect of the third year and each 
subsequent year, calculated from the date of filing of the application.‖); Renewing Your 
Patent, U.K. I.P.O., http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/patent/p-manage/p-renew.htm (explaining 
that in the UK patents must be ―renew[ed] . . . on the 4th anniversary of the filing date and 
every year after that . . . . up to 20 years‖); CANADIAN I.P.O., MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE 
PRACTICE § 24.02.01 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-
internetopic.nsf/vwapj/chapitre24-chapter24-eng.pdf/$file/chapitre24-chapter24-eng.pdf 
(―In order to maintain a patent application in effect, an applicant must pay maintenance 
fees for each one-year period from the second anniversary of the filing date of the 
application.‖). 
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could help tailor a future term reduction years down the road.
156
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Whatever the precise mechanism employed, the results presented in this 
Article suggest that patent rights should diminish, at least marginally if not 
completely so, earlier than they do under current law.  In a world in which 
at least some products are out of date by the time they hit store shelves, the 
last few years of a two-decade-long patent term seem unlikely to incentivize 
greater innovation.  To the contrary, it appears that the waning years of 
patent protection primarily serve to benefit a growing number of litigation-
oriented patentees who do little more with their aging patent rights than 
impose steep legal costs on those selling successful products.  Perhaps 
through future research that dispels concerns raised by the limitations 
discussed above, we will soon gain a deeper understanding of the practical 
costs and benefits of the final years of the patent term that will spur 
legislative action to trim the nation‘s ever-increasing thicket of aging 
patents.   
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 See Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, supra note _, at *25 (―The decision to 
maintain a patent signals its private value to the patent owner.‖). 
Other possible reforms exist that might mitigate the costs of late-term patent 
enforcement.  For example, the U.S. could implement a rule, loosely related to ―working 
requirements‖ in effect in many countries around the world, that patent rights expire unless 
they have been the subject of at least one bona fide license or good faith patent suit within a 
certain number of years following issue.  See generally Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger 
Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 593-97 (2007).  (discussing the 
history of working requirements).  Alternatively, Congress or the courts could institute a 
new defense akin to laches that denies relief to patentees who fail to quickly seek out 
potential infringers and initiate licensing negotiations before filing suit.  See Tun-Jen 
Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, at *30-31 (working paper) (arguing that 35 U.S.C. § 
287 should be reformed to implement a ―contributory search defense‖). 
